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The only real difference I detect in various formulations of the [business
judgment] rule involves the question whether if good faith and due care are
established, there nevertheless remains room for a judicial judgment concerning
the wisdom of the decision.1

I. Introduction
It is a truth almost universally acknowledged that American courts will not review
the substance of the business decisions of corporate directors except under extraordinary
circumstances. Embodied in the much-debated “business judgment rule,”2 the deference
displayed towards the decisions of corporate directors arises not from a belief that
directors are always right, or even always honorable, but from a belief that “investors’
wealth would be lower if managers’ decisions were routinely subjected to strict judicial
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Associate Professor, Department of Law, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of
New York. The author is particularly indebted to the weblogs (usually called “blogs,” sometimes,
“blawgs”) of Professor D. Gordon Smith (www.theconglomerate.org – Smith now shares his blog with
others, but his comments on the business judgment rule discussed here was made when he was blogging
alone at www.venturpreneur.com) and Professor Stephen Bainbridge (www.professorbainbridge.com).
Their lively, but always scholarly, exchange on the issue of good faith gave rise to many of the ideas in this
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January, 2005. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 775 n.4 (2005). This article will make citations
to law blogs as with any other legal source. The reader will be left to his own devices to determine the
value as authority of such sources. Thanks are due to Barry Adler for first suggesting the term “galactic
stupidity” to me and to Baruch College for the financial support it provided during the writing of this
article.
1
In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 1989 WL 7036 at *13 n. 13 (Del. Ch.) (italics added).
2
Indeed the very term “business judgment rule” has come under criticism. One commentator, for example,
insists that it is not a “rule,” but a “standard” with no “bright-line” separating acceptable from prohibited
conduct. Stephen M. Bainbridge, “The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,” 57 Vand L. Rev.
83, 128 (2004).

review.”3 Corporate directors take the kind of risks that investors want them to take
because the directors know that, whatever the outcome, stockholders will not have any
legal recourse for losses arising from those actions unless the decisionmakers violated a
duty such as loyalty or good faith. The belief in this general principle of the business
judgment rule is so widespread that, despite the recent scandals and negative publicity
surrounding the conduct of corporate directors, few participants in the debate are calling
for significant changes to the rule’s deference to actions taken by corporate
decisionmakers.
There is plainly broad agreement that shareholders make more money when
directors know that they can make decisions – especially risky decisions – without the
fear that they4 or the company will be the subject of successful legal actions should those
decisions not ultimately benefit the company or the shareholders themselves. This does
not mean that the legislative, judicial, legal, financial, academic and investor
communities do not view with disdain directors who make bad decisions, foolish
decisions or excessively risky decisions. It simply means that these communities do not
wish to impose legal liability on directors or the corporations they oversee for the
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Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 93 (1991). See
also, In Re Caremark Intern. Inc. Deriv. Lit., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“To employ a different
rule – one that permitted an ‘objective’ evaluation of the decision – would expose directors to substantive
second guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries, which would, in the long-run be injurious to investor
interests.”), E. Norman Veasey and Christine T. Di Guglielmo, “What Happened in Delaware Corporate
Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments,” 153 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1399, 1413 (2005) (Retired Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court and co-author note that “Good
governance practices permit the time-honored business judgment rule regime to operate with integrity by
checking self-interest and sloth while permitting valuable and prudent risk taking.”).
4
This article does not focus on the issue of the personal liability of corporate directors, but rather on the
ability of shareholders to bring any kind of successful legal action (for example, an injunction) against them
or against the company itself for decisions made by the directors on the company’s behalf. While section
102(b)(7) of Delaware’s corporate code permits exculpation of directors for certain breaches of fiduciary
duty, that is a separate issue from the question of the breadth of the business judgment rule’s protection.
For a recent discussion of the exculpation issue, see David Rosenberg, “Making Sense of Good Faith in
Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law,” 29 Del. J. Corp. Law 491 (2004).
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negative consequences of such decisions.5 A board of directors that pig-headedly leads a
corporation in the wrong direction is worthy of our contempt and deserves to be voted out
or abandoned by investors. But our corporate law does not allow the aggrieved to seek
legal action against a corporation just because its directors made a bad decision. As such,
the business judgment rule does not seem to have a moral or ethical dimension. Rather, it
is one our most utilitarian rules. Wealth is maximized when corporations are run by
directors who know that their decisions will be reviewed by investors, by analysts, by
stockholders and by business partners – but not by the courts. 6
From a practical point of view, the business judgment rule is “simply a policy of
judicial non-review.”7 It is -- except when it allows review. The problem is, as a noted
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Of course, the marketplace provides effective extra-legal remedies and incentives that work to promote
good conduct by directors. See, Edward B. Rock and Michael L. Wachter, “Islands of Conscious Power:
Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation,” 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1619, 1672.
6
In the recent decision in the much-litigated case involving Disney’s hiring and firing of Michael Ovitz,
Chancellor Chandler began with an almost-sentimental affirmation of the importance of allowing directors
discretion to create wealth through their own decision-making:
The redress for failures that arise from faithful management must come from the markets, through
the action of shareholders and the free flow of capital, and not from this Court. Should the Court
apportion liability based on the ultimate outcome of decisions taken in good faith by faithful
directors or officers, those decision-makers would necessarily take decisions that minimize risk,
not maximize value. The entire advantage of the risk-taking, innovative, wealth-creating engine
that is the Delaware corporation would cease to exist, with disastrous results for shareholders and
society alike.
In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2005 WL 1875804 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) ( “Disney IV”). In
the most recent decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery appeared to adopt a shorthand system for
referring to the many decisions in the dispute. This article will follow the Court’s lead. The Delaware
Supreme Court heard oral argument in an appeal of the case on January 26, 2006. The reader will notice
the conspicuous absence of Disney III (In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2004 WL 2050138
(Del. Ch. Sept. 10 2004) from this discussion. That ruling is not relevant here because it largely concerned
the issue of whether or not Michael Ovitz owed a fiduciary duty to Disney at the time he was negotiating
his employment package. It did not focus on whether the decisions of the various directors should receive
the protection of the business judgment rule for their decision to approve Ovitz’s compensation package.
7
Lyman Johnson, “The Modest Business Judgment Rule,” 55 Bus. Law. 625, 631 (2000). A more purist
view of the business judgment rule is exemplified by the work of Stephen Bainbridge whose conception of
the corporation requires an almost-reflexive refusal by courts to review director decision-making. See,
Bainbridge “Abstention Doctrine,” supra, note__. Bainbridge argues that, whatever the standard is that
allows review, courts should approach allegations of director misconduct with the presumption that they
will abstain from reviewing the directors’ actions. Such an approach, he says, makes review “the
exception rather than the rule.” Id. at 128. This article attempts to determine when Delaware courts will
make that exception.
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scholar has put it, to identify the circumstances in which review is necessary.8

While

many academics and judges repeatedly assert that the business judgment rule does not
allow for review of the substance of director decision-making, Delaware courts
nonetheless display an apparent willingness to do just that when the directors’ actions
approach the borderline of good faith.9 Indeed, in cases in which the plaintiffs allege bad
faith but the facts do not present evidence of disloyalty or knowing breach of a duty,
courts must review the substance of the directors’ decision in order to determine whether
or not the directors have complied with the all of their fiduciary obligations.
Although few courts or commentators are willing to use the term, substantive due
care analysis is in fact alive in Delaware fiduciary law, and has been for at least two
decades. Whether they call it irrationality, inexplicable behavior, egregious
decisionmaking, gross abuse of discretion, inadequacy, action that is beyond the realm of
human comprehension, sustained inattention, disloyalty or bad faith, judges and
commentators from all sides of the debate must recognize that sometimes courts cannot
avoid reviewing the substantive merits of directors actions. Culminating in the recent
decision in the Disney litigation, Delaware courts express an unwillingness to engage in
substantive review, do it anyway, but almost inevitably find in favor of the defendants.

8

Bainbridge, “Abstention Doctrine,” supra note__at 127.
This article focuses exclusively on Delaware law because it is considered the default source for American
corporate law and because the debate over substantive due care has begun to play out in its courts. While
not the subject of this article, a comparison of Delaware’s approach to that of other states is a subject ripe
for research.

9
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II. Is Substantive Due Care “Foreign” to the Business Judgment Rule?
Courts have a relatively easy time reviewing allegations of disloyalty or selfdealing by corporate directors. Virtually every formulation of the business judgment rule
precludes protection of directors who do not act in the best interests of the company but
rather for their own benefit.10 Rebutting the presumption of director loyalty is a fairly
straightforward matter for the plaintiff. He must simply show that the director herself
benefited from the decision, and that the decision was not fair. The rule therefore allows
aggrieved shareholders to recover when a director made a decision that was tainted by
self-interest and that was not a good deal for the company. To allow a court to review a
disloyal decision and even to impose liability on a company for a disloyal and unfair
decision does not threaten the freedom of directors to act with discretion because in such
a situation one might say that the director did not exercise discretion at all. Rather, the
director acted in direct contradiction to her obligation to make decisions on behalf of the
well-being of the corporation and its shareholders rather than herself.
The appropriateness of judicial review becomes trickier, however, when the
plaintiff alleges not that the director breached his duty of loyalty, but rather that the
director breached some other duty (we will attempt to define it) that did not apparently
involve self-interest. A director breaches no duty simply because he makes a decision
that does not turn out to benefit the corporation even if it was obvious to most observers
at the time that it was a bad decision. It is well-settled that the business judgment rule

10

Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). This justifiably much-maligned decision also held
that courts will presume that directors acted “on an informed basis” and in “good faith.” Id. What these
terms mean is plainly open to question. Its holding regarding loyalty, however, is less controversial.
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will not allow review of director decisions that, in retrospect are “pretty dumb,”11
“substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or
‘irrational.’”12 Delaware courts will not, as Chancellor Chandler recently wrote, “hold
fiduciaries liable for a failure to comply with the aspirational ideal of best practices.”13
Put another way, Delaware courts will not review the substantive wisdom of decisions
made by corporate directors; put another way, courts will not engage in substantive due
care analysis.
Although the phrase “substantive due care” had been used in various jurisdictions
over the years, it became code for that-which-is-not-reviewable in the wake of the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Brehm v. Eisner14 in 2000, the first pivotal
decision in the Disney litigation. In that decision, the court reviewed a lower court ruling
dismissing a shareholder derivative suit against the Walt Disney Company for approving
an extremely generous employment contract for executive Michael Ovitz. The deal
allowed Ovitz to leave the company fourteen months after his hire with a severance
package worth $140 million.15
That shareholders of Disney wanted a court to review the directors’ conduct in
approving such a payout is not surprising. Nor is it surprising that the Delaware Supreme
Court failed to embrace that prospect with much enthusiasm.16 The court took particular
pains to address the plaintiffs’ allegation that the directors failed to exercise “substantive
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Rock and Wachter, supra note__ at 1672.
In Re Caremark Intern. Inc. Deriv. Lit., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
13
Disney IV, at 1.
14
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (“Brehm”).
15
Id.
16
Id., at 266 (noting that it runs “counter to the foundation of our jurisprudence” for courts to “become
super-directors, measuring matters of degree in business decision-making”).
12
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due care.” In a now much-quoted passage17, the court attempted to dispose of the idea of
substantive due care review in Delaware law:
As for the plaintiff’s contention that the directors failed to exercise “substantive
due care,” we should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment
rule. Courts do not measure or quantify directors’ judgments. We do not even
decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due care in the decision-making
context is process due care only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business
judgment rule. Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or
it may tend to show that the decision is not made in good faith, which is a key
ingredient of the business judgment rule.18
Nonetheless, the court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint so that it would
allege more specific facts that might present doubt that the decision of the directors to
approve Ovitz’s employment package was protected by the business judgment rule.19
The language quoted above ought to have put to rest the idea that courts might be
willing to review director decisions based on the substantive wisdom of the decision
itself. Indeed, the author of the opinion, former Chief Justice Veasey has taken to quoting
its language as an unambiguous affirmation of a rule that requires little interpretation.20
Far from it. In fact that ruling led the Court of Chancery to reassert the possibility of

17

A few years after the decision, one commentator said that the decision actually served as a
“reinvigoration of substantive due care” by putting a greater emphasis on the duty of good faith which
might ultimately lead to examination of the substance of a director’s decision. D. Gordon Smith,
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2003/11/the_fiduciary_d.html, November 26, 2003. Smith has since
changed his mind and more recently has described the case as “a modern version of Van Gorkom.”
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/01/emthe_good_fait.html. January 9, 2005. I point out that Smith
changed his mind not to suggest that he is fickle, but rather to illustrate the fluidity of the debate on
substantive due care. It perhaps also illustrates the dangers of using law blogs as legal authority since they
are intended to, among other things, allow their authors to air ideas without committing those ideas to the
permanence of traditional publications.
18
Brehm 746 A.2d at 264.
19
Brehm 746 A.2d at 266.
20
See, E. Norman Veasey, “Juxtaposing Best Practices and Delaware Corporate Jurisprudence,” 18 No. 12
Insights 5 (2004). It is worth pointing out though, that in Brehm, he said that the business judgment rule
had been “well formulated by Aronson…”, Brehm at 264, fn. 64, although that formulation has been almost
universally condemned. See, e.g. Johnson, supra, note__, at 626.
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reviewing director decisions on the substantive merits by simply calling it by another
name.21
III. The “Reinvigoration”22 of Substantive Due Care
In 2003, the Court of Chancery finally got a chance to hear the plaintiffs’
amended complaint in the Disney litigation.23 In refusing to dismiss the complaint, the
court took a hard look at the actions (and inactions) of the company’s directors when they
approved Ovitz’s seemingly preposterous no-fault termination agreement. More or less
ignoring the language used by the Supreme Court in Brehm, the Court of Chancery
focused on the state of mind of the directors, ultimately framing the issue around the
question of good faith.24 The court said that the complaint depicted the directors’ actions
as failures going beyond mere negligence or even gross negligence because the plaintiffs
had claimed that “the defendant directors consciously and intentionally disregarded their
responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude concerning a material
corporate decision.”25 The court placed heavy emphasis on the allegation that the
directors knew that they were making a decision without adequate information and that
they “simply did not care if the decisions caused the corporation and its stockholder to

21
See D. Gordon Smith, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2003/11/the_fiduciary_d.html, November 26,
2003.
22
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2003/11/the_fiduciary_d.html, November 26, 2003
23
In Re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 825 A.2d 275 (2003). (“Disney II”).
24
This was not the first time the Court of Chancery boldly departed from the guidance offered by the
state’s highest court regarding the fiduciary duties of corporate directors. In determining the meaning of
the term “good faith” as it appears in Section 102(b)(7), the law which allows corporations to waive the
liability of directors for certain breaches of fiduciary duty, the Court of Chancery has criticized the
Supreme Court’s language and formulated its own definition of that crucial term. See Rosenberg, supra
note__.
25
Disney II, 825 A.2d at 289. The court said that the complaint charged the board of directors with taking
an “ostrich-like approach regarding Ovitz’s non-fault termination.” Id. at 288. It’s a nice metaphor
(presumably alluding to the popular belief that an ostrich sticks its head in the sand when it encounters
trouble) because it plainly indicates that the board did not merely fail to consider what it might have seen,
but rather it deliberately failed to see.
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suffer injury or loss.”26 If such allegations are true, the court said, defendants might have
breached their obligation “to act honestly and in good faith in the corporation’s best
interests” and their conduct therefore could well have fallen outside the protection of the
business judgment rule.27
This decision made news not only because it concerned two high profile
executives at a world famous company. It made news -- among legal academics at least - because of the court’s apparent new enthusiasm for the duty of good faith. But the
response to the decision led to widely divergent conclusions. At least one commentator,
Hillary Sale, embraced the decision as an indication of the emergence of a “third, and
separate, duty: that of good faith,” distinct from the other two fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty.28 She argued that since the court was not willing to categorize the alleged
misconduct as purely a breach of the duty of care (and thus allow exculpation under
102(b)(7)), it could only be a question of good faith.29 She concluded that “conscious
disregard of one’s duties to the company presents a good faith issue, not simply a
procedural lapse of due care.”30 A key element, then, of Sale’s vision of the duty of good
faith is the state of mind of the director. In order for a director to violate the duty of good
faith, he must have been aware that he was failing to do what he was obligated to do.
Sale, however, does make clear what kind of behavior might constitute a breach of the
duty of good faith but not a breach of the duties of loyalty or care.31

26

Disney II, 825 A.2d at 289.
Disney II, 825 A.2d at 289.
28
Hillary Sale, “Delaware’s Good Faith,” 89 Cornell L. Rev. 456, 482.
29
Id.
30
Id. Sale is perhaps suggesting here that since a breach of good faith is not a “procedural lapse of due
care,” it must therefore be a substantive breach, although she does not use the phrase “substantive due
care.”
31
For my earlier discussion of Sale’s article, see, Rosenberg, supra note__, at 508-509.
27
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Other commentators were more hesitant to view good faith as described in Disney
II as a separate duty. The author of this article, for example, took essentially the opposite
view. He argued that the decision in Disney II fit into a string of cases by the Court of
Chancery that increasingly treat good faith not as a separate duty but rather as a term that
encompasses all of the obligations of corporate officers in the same way that parties to a
contract have a duty of good faith.32 That is to say, the duty of good faith requires
corporate directors to make an honest effort to adhere to the duties of care and loyalty. A
knowing breach of the duties of care or loyalty (or indeed any other duty) is a breach of
the duty of good faith.33 Good faith, however, does not exist as a duty that can be defined
on its own terms without reference to other duties.
In an article that turned out to have a great deal of influence on Chancellor
Chandler’s later decision in Disney IV, Sean Griffith also rejected the idea that a separate
duty of good faith had emerged from Disney II. Rather, he described good faith in
Disney II as a duty that alternates between loyalty and care without actually
encompassing either.34 In that decision, Griffith says, good faith covered ground that was
32

Id. My approach in that article arose from an ideological view (contractarianism) embraced by many
lawyers and academics, that corporations, like other business entities or indeed other business agreements,
should be viewed as simply conglomerations of contractual promises that require adherence to certain
duties by the various parties. Id., at 493-494. While that article suggested that Delaware courts ought to
approach corporate fiduciary duties from a contractarian perspective, the accuracy of my assessment of the
bounds of good faith under Delaware law does not necessarily require adherence to the contractarian view
by the courts.
33
In this article, I will argue that the duty of good faith is in fact more expansive. Delaware courts appear
willing to find that a director acted in bad faith simply because his decision was egregious, even if the
director did not know that he was making an egregiously bad decision. See infra text and accompanying
notes__-__.
34
Sean J. Griffith, “Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law
Jurisprudence,” 55 Duke L. J. 1, at 21-23 (2005). In his article, Griffith employs one of the all-time great
legal metaphors. He says that the duty of good faith alternates between the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty like the image of a caged bird in a thaumatrope. He explains:
[A thaumatrope] is an optical toy involving a disc with a different image on each side – a horse
and a man, for example, or a bird and a cage – and a string attached to either edge of the disc
enabling the device to spin. When the viewer spins the thaumatrope, the images on either side of
the disc seem to blend together to produce a third image that is a composite of the other two – the
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not defined precisely by care or loyalty because the claim in that case could not have
survived a motion to dismiss on either of those traditional fiduciary duties.35 So if a court
is relying on good faith to allow a case alleging director misconduct to go forward, what
is the content of that duty? Griffith believes that good faith ultimately can boil down to
one question: “Are the directors doing their best in acting for someone else?”36 When
framed this way, that duty could indeed include conduct that violates either the duty of
loyalty or the duty of care as well as perhaps other conduct.37
Lyman Johnson views Disney II’s definition of good faith as prohibiting behavior
where the director consciously knows he is disregarding the duties of care or loyalty.38
To Johnson, good faith is all about motive. Focusing on the allegations that the Disney
directors acted with “deliberate indifference” and adopted a “’we don’t care about the
risks’ attitude,” Johnson asserts that the court in Disney II made inferences about the
directors’ motives by evaluating their conduct. Bad faith (that is conduct that is not
properly motivated) can be construed from the nature of the conduct itself. Johnson
presciently explains that, “this allows the court an indirect way to do what the business

man atop the horse or the bird in the cage. Good faith, I argue, is simply the application of the
thaumatrope to the duties of care and loyalty.
Id. at 7-8.
35
Id. at 20.
36
Id. at 43. As we will see, the court in Disney IV did indeed follow Griffith’s dictum by hinting that bad
faith might arise from indifference although the directors might not be aware that they are acting with
indifference.
37
It is therefore not all that different from this author’s view in Rosenberg, supra note__. Both Griffith and
I hold open the possibility that a director can act in bad faith in a way that does not necessarily breach
either the duty of loyalty or care.
38
Lyman Johnson, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties,” 30 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1149, 12021203 (2004). On his blog, D. Gordon Smith expressed a similar view: that good faith review and
substantive review are essentially the same thing and that the rise of good faith might be leading to greater
substantive review in the future. http://www.theconglomerate.org/2003/11/the_fiduciary_d.html
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judgment rule precludes –consider the substance of director conduct; not to assess it
outright, but to draw an inference of bad motive if it is sufficiently egregious.”39
Another scholar, Stephen Bainbridge, addressed the implications of the Disney II
decision on his blog. Bainbridge is an ardent proponent of the “director primacy” view of
the corporation which regards directors as the ultimate powerbrokers in publicly held
corporations.40 Such a view prefers that the business judgment rule be understood as a
doctrine of abstention, “pursuant to which courts in fact refrain from reviewing board
decisions unless exacting preconditions for review are satisfied.”41 On his blog,
Bainbridge attempted to reconcile the Disney II decision with existing law by offering
two competing interpretations of the court’s decision that allowed judicial review of the
Disney directors’ vote to approve Ovitz’s compensation package.
In his preferred42 interpretation, he suggested that the court simply understood the
case as one of “egregiously flawed process due care.”43 Viewed in this way, the court
focused not so much on the merits of the decision, but on the procedures through which
the board approved it. This view rejects the possibility that the decision can be
interpreted as a reinvigoration of substantive due care because it focuses exclusively on
the alleged procedural deficiencies of the directors’ decision-making and not on the
substantive wisdom of the decision itself.

39

Johnson, supra note__, at 1203. This seems to come closest to a prediction of what the Court of
Chancery would later do in Disney IV.
40
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, “Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,” 97
Nw. U. L. Rev. 547 (2003).
41
Stephen M. Bainbridge, “The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,” 57 Vand. L. Rev. 83, 88
(2004). The crucial question, of course, is what are those exacting pre-conditions, and what should they
be? This article attempts to answer only the former question.
42
“Preferred,” both in the sense of what he thinks the court was saying in its decision and in the sense that
he believes that this interpretation is preferable.
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2003/11/substantive_due.html, November 29, 2003.
43
Id.
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Bainbridge’s second proposed interpretation is more consistent with those who
have suggested that the decision opens the door to substantive review. He suggests, as an
alternative to his preferred interpretation, that the court found the Disney board’s decision
to be “so egregiously unsound on the merits as to shock the court’s conscience and,
therefore, fall outside the protections of the business judgment rule.”44 This sounds like
Bainbridge is leaving open the possibility that the court was reintroducing the doctrine of
substantive due care. But he does not really buy this interpretation. Bainbridge goes on
to say that the facts of the case suggest that more than mere irrationality was motivating
the directors: “The story that emerges is one of cronyism and backroom deals in which
preservation of face was put ahead of the corporation’s best interest… [T]his looks like
another case in which ‘we have reason to disbelieve the protestations of good faith by
directors who reach “irrational” conclusions.’”45 To Bainbridge, almost any action that
does not receive business judgment rule protection inevitably contains at least some
elements of disloyalty or self-dealing even if plaintiffs are alleging only breaches of the
duty of care or so-called good faith. This comports with the Court of Chancery’s earlier
view that good faith “is a subset or ‘subsidiary requirement’ that is subsumed within the
duty of loyalty.”46 According to this formulation, any act of bad faith must be disloyal,
but not every act of disloyalty must be bad faith.47
IV. Substantive Due Care and the Reasonable Director
While the first two Disney decisions, Brehm and Disney II, appear to have done
little to reconcile the various competing views of the business judgment rule, a hard look

44

Id.
Id. (quoting Michael P. Dooley, Fundamentals of Corporation Law 263 (1995)).
46
Emerald Partners, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, at *89 n. 63.
47
A director could make a decision that is disloyal without knowing that he is being disloyal.
45
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at Delaware law reveals that the rule allows for review of the merits of director
decisionmaking in extreme cases and that the conduct of the Disney directors is one such
case. That the court was willing to do so in Disney IV is not surprising. The apparent rise
of the duty of good faith even in the absence of disloyalty is merely a manifestation of the
willingness of the Delaware Court of Chancery to allow substantive due care review
despite the Delaware Supreme Court’s earlier insistence that it is “foreign to the business
judgment rule.”48 However, although courts do engage in such review, they rarely are
willing to hold directors liable for even such awful decisions as the one by the Disney
directors to approve Michael Ovitz’s compensation package. The Court of Chancery’s
decision in Disney IV exemplifies such substantive review.
Virtually every formulation of the business judgment rule under Delaware law
contains a requirement that the directors act honestly or in good faith.49 But that is
merely the starting point. It is difficult to come up with a definition of the business
judgment rule that does not beg the question, “what do we mean by ‘good faith?’” For
example, former Chancellor Allen, probably the Chancery Court’s clearest thinker of the
last twenty years, described the bounds of the business judgment rule in the following
way in an influential decision:
Whether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision
substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through “stupid” to
“egregious” or “irrational” provides no ground for director liability, so long as the
court determines that the process employed was either rational or employed in a
good faith effort to advance corporate interests.”50
48

Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264.
Courts and commentators must take as their starting point, the Delaware Supreme Court’s definition in
the highly problematic Aronson v. Lewis which held that the business judgment rule presumes “that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984). The body of literature criticizing that decision on various grounds is voluminous and continues to
grow.
50
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
49
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Stephen Bainbridge usefully points out that in an earlier decision, Chancellor Allen said
that rationality and good faith are essentially the same thing: “’such limited substantive
review as the rule contemplates (i.e. is the judgment under review “egregious” or
“irrational” or “so beyond reason,” etc.) really is a way of inferring bad faith.’” 51 And
Bainbridge himself does not dispute that rationality is necessary for an action to receive
business judgment rule protection.52 Despite the abundance of such formulations of the
business judgment rule, we are still left to define “good faith” and “rational” on our own.
Most students of corporate law are extremely reluctant to suggest that the concept
of the reasonable person that pervades other areas of law (such as torts) should be
applicable to corporate directors. We hesitate to speak of what a reasonable director
might do in a given situation because, unlike in a situation involving everyday torts, a
reasonable director might have chosen many different paths for the corporation he
oversees.53 The ”reasonable” director standard seems too strict because the very term
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Stephen Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics, 274 (quoting In Re RJR Nabisco, Inc.
Shareholders Litig., 1989 WL 7036 at *13, n. 13 (Del. Ch. 1989) . Interestingly, in the same discussion,
Bainbridge then goes on to equate irrationality with self-interest alone, a position that seems to be unique to
him. Id. Numerous other commentaries have equated rationality with good faith, including one by the
then-Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court. E. Norman Veasey, “Musings on the Dynamics of
Corporate Governance Issues, Director Liability Concerns, Corporate Control Transactions, Ethics and
Federalism, U. Pa. L. Rev. 1007, 1009 (2003) (“Although the concept of good faith is not fully developed
in the case law, an argument could be made that reckless, irresponsible, or irrational conduct but not
necessarily self-dealing or larcenous conduct could implicate concepts of good faith.”).
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Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics, supra note__, at 274. See also,
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2003/11/substantive_due.html, November 29, 2003, (“an essential
precondition for application of the business judgment rule long has been the absence of irrationality.”). But
he is not willing to say that an inquiry into the rationality of a decision would constitute substantive review
of the merits of the decision. Bainbridge, Corporation Law, supra note__ at 274.
53
William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs and Leo E. Strine, “Realigning the Standard of Review of director Due
Care With Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard of Review
Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 449, 454 (2002). The chancellors use as an example the case of automobile
accidents. They point out that in that context, “only one decision is reasonable in a given set of
circumstances, so decisions that turn out badly almost invariably turn out to have been bad decisions.” Id.
In contrast, if the business judgment rule stands for anything at all, it is that decisions that turn out badly
are not necessarily bad decisions.
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carries with it the suggestion that only one – or perhaps a few – courses of conduct were
reasonable under any given set of circumstance.
Since the “reasonable director” standard is disfavored, some other standard, not
too strict and not utterly lacking in teeth must prevail. Rather than asking whether a
director acted “reasonably,” courts often asked whether she acted “rationally.” Former
Chancellor Allen and Chancellors Jacobs and Strine argue that “a rationality standard
gives directors greater freedom to make risky decisions than a reasonableness
standard.”54 And they attempt to draw a distinction between these two standards
(reasonable and rational) by defining an irrational decision as one “that is so blatantly
imprudent that it is inexplicable, in the sense that no well-motivated and minimally
informed person could have made it.”55 But it is not obvious how much broader this
standard really is than a reasonable director standard. What kind of behavior does not
pass the reasonable director standard that would pass the rationality test as described
above? Neither the requirement of prudence, good motivation nor minimal information
seems to allow much behavior that would not already be permissible under the
requirement that a director act reasonably. It is not clear, then, how the widely accepted
rationality standard differs in reality from the much-shunned reasonableness standard.
And indeed, application of the rationality standard often sounds a lot like an application
of the reasonableness standard and therefore an inquiry into the substance of the
directors’ decision.
In a well-known case in which a board of directors was accused of breaching its
fiduciary duty to accept the highest price available in a tender offer, Chancellor Allen
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Id., at 452.
Allen et al. supra note__, at 452 (italics added).
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allowed the directors to be protected by the business judgment rule.56 Though he
explicitly rejects the idea that he has engaged in substantive review of the directors’
action, much of his language, sounds very much like an inquiry into its substance:
…it was not beyond the range of reasonable responses, in the circumstances in
which the overall objective was to get a committed deal at $64 per share cash
from [the bidder]… These are precisely the sort of debatable questions that are
beyond the expertise of courts and which the business judgment rule generally
protects from substantive review for wisdom… certainly, the decision… in these
circumstances does not fall so far afield of the expected range of responses to
warrant an inference that [they] must have been motivated by a concern other than
maximizing the value of shareholders interest.57
Here, Chancellor Allen appears to be asking whether a reasonable director might have
done the same thing under the circumstances; whether the director’s actions were of the
type that might have been expected under the circumstances. Because the directors’
actions appeared to be reasonable, they did not allow for an inference that the directors
were motivated by improper concerns. That is to say, because the directors’ actions were
reasonable, they were in good faith. The case does not stand for the proposition that
anything worse than “reasonable” or “expected” is actionable but it does suggest that
decisions outside of the usual range of what is expected might lead to an inference that
the director acted in bad faith. Allen explicitly rejects the possibility of substantive
review of the decision, but then seems to be reviewing its substance. How can a court
decide if a decision is “reasonable” or if it falls within the “expected range of
responses”58 without first examining the substantive wisdom of the decision itself?
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In re J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988).
Id. at 783. Italics added.
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Here, the wisdom of Allen et al.’s contrasting of corporate decisionmaking with other kinds of
decisionmaking becomes crucial. The range of unactionable decisions by a driver when approaching a stop
sign is very narrow. Pretty much any decision other than to stop at the white line could give rise to a cause
of action in negligence. Anything else is “far afield of the range of expected responses.” But given the
innumerable variables at work in corporate decisionmaking, the range of expected responses is very wide
indeed. A court can only determine if a decision is within that range by evaluating its substance.
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Justice Veasey explicitly rejected any notion of the reasonableness standard in
Brehm I only to embrace it more recently in a speech, perhaps inadvertently. In Brehm I,
Veasey wrote, “Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments. We do
not even decide if they are reasonable in this context.”59 But a few years later, in a
speech in which he quoted much of the Brehm I opinion verbatim, Veasey said, “If the
board’s decision or conduct is irrational or so beyond reason that no reasonable director
would credit the decision or conduct, lack ofgood faith may, in some circumstances, be
inferred.”60 This too is beginning to sound like the reasonableness standard. When a
court is willing to ask, “would a reasonable director have approved this decision,” it is
indeed measuring or quantifying a director’s judgment.61
Once we are asking what a reasonable director would have done, we must decide
what we mean by “reasonable.” Volumes of literature already exist on this question in
other contexts, particularly torts. Studies of corporate law have not inquired into the
definition of a reasonable director because the prevailing wisdom has been that the law
calls for no such inquiry. But as the above discussion demonstrates, in order to know
whether an action receives the protection of the business judgment rule, it might be
relevant to ask whether a reasonable director would have approved it.
The reasonable standard works well in torts because, as Allen et al. point out,
there, “typically only one decision is reasonable in a given set of circumstances.”62 In an
area like traffic safety, the law is plainly designed to discourage risk-taking because such
59
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behavior offers virtually no social utility. In the corporate marketplace however, risktaking is an inherent part of virtually every decision a director makes – and we want it
that way.63 While most corporate lawyers hesitate to use this kind of language, it is
oftentimes reasonable for a corporate director to make a decision – even one that an
impartial observer might call rash or risky – that is unlikely to benefit the shareholders of
the corporation because corporate decision-making requires taking risks.64 It is even
reasonable for a corporate director to make a decision that turns out to harm his company
and that a judge might later find to be puzzling or misguided. We want directors to make
these kinds of decisions because often enough they turn out to enrich the shareholders.
And indeed, the law allows a great deal of discretion for directors to take such risks -- as
long as they act rationally and in good faith. Although few commentators are willing to
say so explicitly, the law seems to be saying that a rational director is simply one who
has made a decision that a reasonable director might also have made. In tort law, we ask
what a reasonable person would have done under the circumstances. Perhaps, the
business judgment rule is really simply asking what decision would a reasonable director
have made under the circumstances, implicitly acknowledging that the circumstances of a
corporation call for very different standards of risk taking, uncertainty and tolerance for
failure.

63

Allen et al. put it nicely: “Because the expected value of a risky business decision may be greater than
that of a less risky decision, directors may be acting in the best interest of the shareholders when they
choose the riskier alternative.” Allen et al., supra note __ at 455. For a discussion of how the law can
encourage risk-taking in other kinds of business organizations, see, David Rosenberg, “Venture Capital
Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of Contract,” 2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev 363 (2002).
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Again, this is in contrast to automobile driving in which there will always be liability for calculated risks
that turn out badly. Perhaps my use of the term “calculated” begs the question. We expect directors to take
risks based on their knowledge of the extent of the risk. But if no calculation is made and the decision
turns out badly, that might very well constitute bad faith on the part of the director.
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As Allen et al. acknowledge, it is very difficult to come up with a meaningful
distinction between the standards of “reasonable” and “rational” as they apply to
corporate directors.65 It is perhaps impossible, because a rational director is one who
makes only decisions that he believes to be reasonable. After all, it would not be rational
for a director to make a decision that he believes does not rise to the level of what a
reasonable director would do.66 If the director knew that his decision was unreasonable,
then surely his action would constitute irrationality or bad faith. If the director did not
know that his decision was unreasonable, then he himself is by definition an unreasonable
director and he has come very close to the kind of irrationality that is not protected by the
business judgment rule. Further, if the director’s decision is objectively reasonable, it
does not matter whether he employed a rational procedure to arrive at that decision.
But the standard for culpability for a breach of the duty of care by a corporate
director is not merely negligence (by reviewing the reasonableness of the director’s
actions), but rather gross negligence, which, in the corporate context, means “”reckless
indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders or actions
which are ‘without the bounds of reason.’”67 Or as Allen et al. paraphrase the Delaware
Supreme Court’s decision in Brehm, “the gross negligence standard applicable in due
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They explain:
Admittedly, the distinction between “reasonable” and “rational” action is often subtle and elusive
to grasp. Linguistically, it is odd to think of a board decision as unreasonable yet “rational,” since
both concepts rest in great part on whether the conduct was logical in the circumstances.
Allen et al., supra note__, at fn. 13.
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For a similar argument regarding the definition of good faith under Section 102(b)(7), see Rosenberg,
supra note__.
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Allen et al., supra note __ at 453, citing Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., No. 7861, 95 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 327 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990). That is to say, an unknowingly bad action on the part of a director
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care cases is, functionally speaking, a proxy for the rationality standard of the business
judgment rule.”68
All commentators agree that courts ought to be able to review director decisions if
those decisions are either irrational or made in bad faith. Some, however, believe that
such review is never substantive because any irrational or bad faith act on the part of a
director must necessarily implicate his duty of loyalty. These commentators cannot
conceive of examples in which director conduct rose to the level of irrationality or bad
faith for some reason other than self-interest. Stephen Bainbridge, for example, says that
“inquiry into the rationality of a decision is a proxy for an inquiry into whether the
decision was tainted by self-interest.”69 Since, to Bainbridge, irrationality is bad faith,
the only kind of breach that should not be protected by the business judgment rule is a
breach of the duty of loyalty. Yet one case he cites to support this proposition is clearly
not a borderline case: in Parnes v. Bally Entertainment, cited in Bainbridge’s treatise, the
plaintiff had alleged bribery on the part of the CEO. That case is plainly one in which
self-interest plays a key role and is not merely being inferred from the substantives
awfulness of the board’s decisions.70
Yet even Bainbridge seems to allow for the possibility that courts will allow
review of the substantive merits of a decision:
it may be that there are some board decision that are so dumb that the business
judgment rule will not insulate them from judicial review. Even if the set of such
decision is not an empty one, however, the tail ought not wag the dog. Because a
prerequisite of rationality easily can erode into a prerequisite of reasonableness,
68

Allen et al. supra note__ at 457. In the same article, the authors assert that the “gross negligence
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Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics, supra note__, at 274.
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courts must tread wearily here. If they want to persist in requiring that there be a
rational business purpose, at least they can ensure that that requirement lacks
teeth.71
There must be a point at which a court will look at a decision that appears to be free from
any hint of disloyalty and review it simply because of its utter galactic stupidity.72
Bainbridge is merely saying that he prefers that point to be relatively far in the direction
of stupidity because he does not want courts reviewing director decision-making using a
reasonableness standard. But this is precisely what the Disney IV court did.
V. The Application of Substantive Due Care Analysis
The central holding in Chancellor Chandler’s decision in Disney IV cleared the
defendant directors of personal liability for allegedly acting in bad faith in approving
Michael Ovitz’s stupendously generous compensation package. Given that the directors’
cursory approval of that package was, in retrospect, a truly awful decision from a
business point of view, the court’s refusal to impose liability can be interpreted, at least
superficially, as a victory for supporters of a broad interpretation of the business
judgment rule’s protection. Certainly these facts looked like a rather compelling case for
bad faith. While Chandler acknowledged that the directors failed “to comply with the
aspirational ideal of best practices,” in most of the opinion he seemed defiantly opposed
to allowing courts to review the substance of their decision-making.73 And yet, when
faced with the task of justifying his decision not to impose liability on any of the
directors, Chandler, like other Delaware judges before him, indeed showed a willingness
to review the substance of the decision the directors had made.
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At the outset of his discussion of the legal standards for imposition of liability in
the case, Chandler says that his decision will not hinge on the duty of loyalty, but rather
on whether the directors adhered to their duties of care and good faith74, although he later
also admits that “[d]ecisions from the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of
Chancery are far from clear with respect to whether there is a separate duty of good
faith.”75 The reader must already have the sense that, even with these made-to-order
facts, Chandler is not going to provide a definition of the duty of good faith that will
unify the various versions provided by Delaware courts in the past. Nonetheless, what
emerges from the opinion is at least one example of what the limits of good faith conduct
might be when the conduct of directors is pushed to the very edge of business judgment
rule protection. Based on his discussion of the failings of the various directors, it is clear
that Chandler would find bad faith when a director takes action that he knows is not in
the best interests of the corporation although that action in no way benefits the interests
of the director himself either. The key to Chandler’s analysis is his examination of the
intentions of the directors. While the conduct of most of the directors did not suggest to
Chandler that they acted in bad faith – and their intentions did not need to be examined -the conduct of the two most uninvolved directors came very close indeed. Since there
was scant evidence regarding their deliberations, it was impossible to determine whether
or not these directors knew that they were making a bad decision. Therefore, in order to
establish that their conduct did not rise to the level of bad faith, Chandler did what all
judges must do when assessing allegations of non-disloyal bad faith: he evaluated the
substantive wisdom of their decision.
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Chandler acknowledges that “issues of good faith are (to a certain degree)
inseparably and necessarily intertwined with the duties of care and loyalty,”76 and his
opinion wrestles with distinguishing between the two. At the outset of his discussion of
the business judgment rule, Chandler quotes at length from Sean Griffith’s article on the
subject in which Griffith points out what should be obvious but has been absent from
most discussions of the business judgment rule: that an ordinarily prudent corporate
director would not behave disloyally; that an ordinarily prudent corporate director would
not knowingly act against the best interests of the corporation.77 The key point which
Chandler extracts from Griffith is that an egregious breach of the duty of care can be
disloyalty and that disloyalty is necessarily bad faith. This point emerges later on in
Chandler’s opinion:
Upon long and careful consideration, I am of the opinion that the concept of
intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities, is
an appropriate (although not the only) standard for determining whether
fiduciaries have acted in good faith. Deliberate indifference and inaction in the
face of a duty to act is, in my mind, conduct that is clearly disloyal to the
corporation. It is the epitome of faithless conduct.78
This statement clearly equates actionable negligence with disloyalty and therefore bad
faith.79 Directors will be free from liability if they unknowingly or unintentionally act
against the best interests of the corporation. On the other hand, a director who knowingly
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or intentionally acts against the best interests of the corporation will have acted disloyally
and therefore in bad faith even if his actions did not benefit him personally.
So how can a court know if a director’s conduct falls in that narrow area between
self-serving disloyalty and gross negligence? If the director acted with a malicious
motive, then bad faith is easy to infer. But Chandler purports to be unsure about the
possibility of establishing bad faith, absent such evidence: “It is unclear, based upon
existing jurisprudence, whether motive is a necessary element for a successful claim that
a director acted in bad faith, and, if so, whether that motive must be shown explicitly or
whether it can be inferred from the director’s conduct.”80 Although Chandler expresses
such doubts, his discussion of some of directors’ failings plainly relies on an analysis of
their conduct itself absent any reference to their possible motive to act as they did.
Chandler addresses the alleged liability of each defendant director in separate
sections because the evidence presented regarding the alleged misconduct of each
director was different. He begins with CEO Michael Eisner, “clearly the person most
heavily involved in bringing Ovitz to the Company.”81 Although he points out Eisner’s
many failings as a corporate leader, Chandler rejects the possibility that Eisner acted with
gross negligence because the plaintiff failed to establish that Eisner was not aware of “all
material information reasonably available” regarding Ovitz’s employment package.82
Further, because Eisner was so involved and because the evidence of Eisner’s motives in
hiring Ovitz were so well-documented, Chandler has an easy time probing Eisner’s mind
and concluding that his actions, “were taken with the subjective belief that those actions
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were in the best interests of the company.” 83 That is all that is required to free Eisner
from liability because that subjective belief establishes Eisner’s good faith.
Chandler next discusses the allegations against Irwin Russell who was chairman
of the compensation committee. Here again, Chandler criticizes Russell’s conduct as
falling far short of the ideal course of action, but also finds that such shortcomings did
not constitute gross negligence because “Russell for the most part knew what he needed
to know… and was doing the best he thought he could to advance the interest of the
company…”84 Note here that Chandler is not evaluating the substantive worthiness or
wisdom of the decision. Rather, he is saying that Russell’s decision passes muster
because he based it on the information that was reasonably available to him at the time.
There appears to be nothing about the way that the decision was reached that might
implicate Russell’s good faith. As with Eisner, Chandler’s conclusion about Russell’s
motives and state of mind are sufficient to clear him of any allegations of bad faith.
Chandler evaluates the conduct of director Raymond Watson in a similar fashion.
He points out that Watson was familiar with Ovitz’s proposed package and with the
executive compensation decisions more generally. Alluding to the decision in Disney II,
Chandler says that “[n]othing in his conduct leads me to believe that he took an ‘ostrichlike’ approach to considering and approving,”85 Ovitz’s contract. He means that the
evidence does not suggest that Watson deliberately avoided important facts in reaching
his decision. Since Chandler finds no evidence that leads him to believe that Watson
“had anything in mind other than the best interests of the Company,”86 he finds that
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Watson did not act in bad faith. Again, the holding regarding Watson focuses solely on
the nature of Watson’s conduct rather than his substantive decision.
Chandler’s analysis however takes a radical turn when he addresses the conduct
and decision of two other directors, Sidney Poitier and Ignacio Lozano. It is clear from
the outset that these two were much less involved in the decisionmaking regarding
Ovitz’s hiring and that, of all the directors, their conduct comes closest to gross
negligence or bad faith.87 But what sets apart the opinion’s discussion of Poitier and
Lozano is that, unlike in his discussion of all the other directors, here Chandler takes a
close look at the substantive reasonableness of their decision in order to conclude that
they were neither grossly negligent nor acting in bad faith.88
As in his discussion of the other directors, Chandler presents Poitier and Lozano
as less than ideal directors who nevertheless were made aware of “all material reasonable
available” to them.89 But unlike in his analysis of the other directors, Chandler here takes
the time to judge the reasonableness of the decision based on the information available.
Viewed objectively, the compensation committee was asked to make a
decision knowing that: 1) Ovitz was a third party with whom Russell negotiated at
arms' length; 2) regardless of whether Ovitz truly was “the most powerful man in
Hollywood,” he was a highly-regarded industry figure; 3) Ovitz was widely
believed to possess skills and experience that would be very valuable to the
Company, especially in light of the CapCities/ABC acquisition, Wells' death, and
Eisner's medical problems; 4) in order to accept the Company's presidency, Ovitz
was leaving and giving up his very successful business, which would lead a
reasonable person to believe that he would likely be highly successful in similar
87
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pursuits elsewhere in the industry; 5) the CEO and others in senior management
were supporting the hiring; and 6) the potential compensation was not
economically material to the Company.90
From this, Chandler concludes that Poitier and Lozano “acted in a manner that they
believed was in the best interests of the corporation.”91 But viewing the facts in the
paragraph excerpted objectively (as Chandler does) does not necessarily lead to that
conclusion. Rather, it leads to the conclusion that a reasonable director might have
approved Ovitz’s package based on the facts at hand. Here, Chandler is holding that
Poitier and Lozano breached no duty, not because the evidence suggests that they took
the appropriate care and had the appropriate motives, but because the decision itself was
reasonable based on the facts presented to them. With regard to Poitier and Lozano,
therefore, Chandler has reached his decision by judging the substantive wisdom of their
actions. This is precisely what a strict interpretation of the business judgment rule is
supposed to prohibit.
Why the special treatment for Poitier and Lozano? The court took the extreme
measure of evaluating the substance of the actions of these directors because it could not
establish good faith and the absence of gross negligence based on the procedural
evidence alone. While the other directors had appeared at least to attempt to acquire the
necessary information to arrive at a decision in the best interests of the company, thereby
demonstrating good faith and care, there was virtually nothing in Poitier and Lozano’s
conduct from which adherence to those duties could be construed. Indeed, it might be
said that their action comes close to being outside the protections of the business
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judgment rule because there is not much evidence that it had any rational basis
whatsoever.
Chandler was of course aware of the requirement that a directors’ decision be
arrived at in a rational way. Earlier in his opinion, he quoted at length from Chancellor
Allen’s decision in Caremark, in which Allen explained why business judgment rule
analysis requires a focus on procedure and not substance:
What should be understood, but may not widely be understood by courts or
commentators who are not often required to face such questions, is that
compliance with a director's duty of care can never appropriately be judicially
determined by reference to the content of the board decision that leads to a
corporate loss, apart from consideration of the good faith or rationality of the
process employed. That is, whether a judge or jury considering the matter after
the fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending
through “stupid” to “egregious” or “irrational,” provides no ground for director
liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed was either
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests. To
employ a different rule-one that permitted an “objective” evaluation of the
decision-would expose directors to substantive second guessing by ill-equipped
judges or juries, which would, in the long-run, be injurious to investor interests.
Thus, the business judgment rule is process oriented and informed by a deep
respect for all good faith board decisions.92
But Chandler could not find any real evidence of rational behavior by Poitier or Lozano,
so he had to look elsewhere to justify their decision. The only way for Chandler to
establish the good faith of these directors was to examine the substance of the decision
and conclude that it was reasonable under the circumstances even it was not arrived at
through a rational procedure.
As discussed earlier, the conventional view of the business judgment rule is that it
requires that directors make rational – not necessarily reasonable – decisions.93 But in
Disney IV, Chandler was unable to find evidence that the directors employed a rational
92

Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 113, quoting Caremark Intern. Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959,
967-68 (Del. Ch. 1996).
93
See supra text and accompanying notes__-__.

29

process in arriving at their decision. He therefore looked at the substantive
reasonableness of the decision by the two most uninvolved directors and found that their
decision was not actionable because “viewed objectively”94 it was reasonable and
therefore in good faith. This is precisely what Chancellor Allen seems to have done in In
Re J.P. Stevens.95 In that case, Allen refused to impose liability on directors because
their decision “was not beyond the range of reasonable responses…” and did not “fall so
far afield of the expected range of responses to warrant an inference that [they] must have
been motivated by a concern other than maximizing the value of shareholders’ interest.”96
VI. Applying the “Galactic Stupidity” Standard
The distinction between a rational director (the accepted standard) and a
reasonable director (the standard occasionally applied) is perhaps meaningless. While
demonstrating rationality (for example by showing that the director considered the
information available in making his decision) is enough to warrant the protection of the
business judgment rule, rationality is not the only way for a director to avoid liability. In
the absence of such evidence, Delaware courts may well consider the reasonableness of
the decision to establish the good faith of the director even though the evidence does not
suggest that the director acted rationally in arriving at that decision. Absent evidence of
rational deliberation, a court may then examine the substantive reasonableness of a
94

Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 157.
See supra text and accompanying notes__-__.
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J.P. Stevens at 783. Chancellor Allen used similar language in the increasingly cited case of Gagliardi v.
Trifoods International, 683 A.2d 1049 (1996). In discussing the business judgment rule’s protection for
directors who make risky decisions, Allen said:
[the business judgment rule] in effect provides that where a director is independent and
disinterested, there can be no liability for corporate loss, unless the facts are such that no person
could possibly authorize such a transaction if he or she were attempting in good faith to meet their
duty.
Gagliardi, at 1052-1053, citing Saxe v. Brady, Del. Ch. 184 A.2d 602 (1962). Again, regardless of the
process used to arrive at the decision, courts will not impose liability for a decision as long as a person
acting in good faith might also have made that decision. The only way that a court can know if the
decision rises to that level is to examine its substantive wisdom.
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director’s decision in order to infer the director’s good faith. But this inquiry does not
really have to do with the motives or good faith of the director. Rather it is plainly an
inquiry into the substantive reasonableness of the decision using gross negligence as the
standard. Directors therefore get two swings of the bat: they show good faith if they have
demonstrated that they made their decision rationally; and they can show good faith if
their decision was reasonable, even if they did not arrive at that decision in a rational
manner.97
Even the most ardent opponent of substantive review agrees that in extreme cases,
courts might have to engage in such analysis. While insisting that bad faith almost
always arises from self-interest, Stephen Bainbridge nonetheless agrees that sometimes
substantive analysis will be necessary, although in keeping with his “abstention doctrine”
he would like to set the bar very high indeed.98 The set of such cases in which a judge
might engage in substantive review under the business judgment rule is perhaps small
because virtually any decision by a director that is not disloyal can in some way be found
to be rational. But where a court finds no evidence of rationality, it will inevitably ask if
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This also seems to fit nicely with Robert Thompson and D. Gordon Smith’s paraphrase of Justice
Vesey’s opinion in Brehm: “[c]ourts will sometimes use substance (‘irrationality’)as a proxy for
determining good faith.” Robert Thompson and D. Gordon Smith, “Toward a New Theory of the
Shareholder Role: ‘Sacred Space’ in Corporate Takeovers,” 80 Tex. L. Rev. 261 (2001). The section of
Sean Griffith’s article that was quoted at length in the Disney III opinion also hints at this, although
Chancellor Chandler did not emphasize the language Griffith uses:
Would an ordinarily prudent person lease a corporate asset to a third party on exceedingly
generous terms? Would an ordinarily prudent person lavish compensation on a third party and
permit the third party to divert investment opportunities that would otherwise come her way?
These are duty of loyalty concerns framed as duty of care questions.
Griffith, supra note__ at __, quoted in Disney IV, 2005 WL 1875804 at 106. According to Griffith, some
decisions are so imprudent that they must implicate the duty of loyalty and therefore the duty of good faith.
In Disney IV, Chandler examined the conduct of the most imprudent Disney directors in this way, but
ultimately without insisting that a finding of bad faith would necessarily constitute a finding of disloyalty.
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Bainbridge, supra note__ at 275. In his discussion, Bainbridge himself finds three well-known Delaware
cases that suggest that substantive review is appropriate in extreme circumstances. Disney IV is surely a
fourth.
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the substance of the decision was reasonable. As such, a court may very well find bad
faith by simply evaluating the sheer galactic stupidity of a decision.
VII. Conclusion
Courts correctly shy away from reviewing the substance of directors’ decisions
unless it is clear that the director had a conflict of interest that influenced his decision.
This policy serves the goal of allowing directors to take risks in the interests of the
corporation. But it wrong to insist that courts never examine the substantive
reasonableness of directors’ decisions. This approach ignores the ability of courts to
evaluate what a reasonable director would do by taking into account the speculativeness
and inherent risk-taking necessary to run a corporation. Where disputes do not present
evidence regarding the procedural reasonableness of a director’s decision or evidence
regarding the director’s state of mind, courts must inevitably evaluate the substance of the
director’s decision. Courts do not usually have to make such an inquiry, but they will in
cases that approach the edge of the business judgment rule’s protections. Courts will not
often impose liability for the galactic stupidity of directors, but the possibility must exist
or else the duty of good faith dissolves completely (and therefore uselessly) into a duty of
loyalty and nothing more. There is no danger in asking what a reasonable director would
do because the answer is: a reasonable director would make the kind of decision that a
rational director acting in good faith would make. And that standard is not any more
strict than the one that already prevails under the business judgment rule.
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